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Abstract
By combining the insights from the widespread research on entrepreneur-
ial spin-o¤s and from the emerging literature on hiring choices in startups,
we investigate the role of coworker mobility in pushed and pulled spin-o¤
survival. We address two main gaps identied in prior research: the relative
inattention paid to other human resources beyond the founder, and the hetero-
geneous context where employee startups may be established. We use a rich
matched employer-employee dataset for Portugal, and estimate a multi-stage
model addressing the issues of self-selection in entrepreneurship and endo-
geneity in recruitment choices. We nd that spin-o¤s hiring coworkers from
the parent rm survive longer. The survival bonus resulting from coworker
mobility is higher in pushed-driven startups. This work has important im-
plications for broader theories on the role of labor mobility in organizational
outcomes of arrival rms, and also for developing theories on labor markets
for entrepreneurship. It also constitutes an important step towards unpacking
the mechanisms through which mobile human capital a¤ects the performance
of receiving rms.
Keywords: entrepreneurship, coworker mobility, pushed and pulled spin-
o¤s, new venture survival
We acknowledge GEP-MSESS (Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeamento  Ministério da Soli-
dariedade, do Emprego e da Segurança Social) for allowing the use of Quadros de Pessoal dataset.
trod ct o
Most new rms are spawned by existing rms (Campbell et al., 2012; Sørenson and Fassiotto,
2011). Moreover, new rm founders rarely venture out alone, and often rely on former coworkers
to set up a team (Agarwal et al., 2015; Groysberg et al., 2008). That was the case of James
Wood Johnson and Edward Mead Johnson, who left their job at Seabury & Johnson in 1886,
together with eight women and six men recruited from their previous company, to found Johnson
& Johnson (Agarwal et al., 2015). These former coworkers helped the new venture opening its
doors and being successful.1
Inter-rm labor mobility has been investigated by scholars from di¤erent elds (including
economics, human resource management, strategic management, and sociology), and its e¤ects
on key organizational outcomes (e.g., innovation, learning, productivity, survival) is strongly
acknowledged (Mawdsley and Somaya, 2015; Parrota and Pozzoli, 2012; Song et al., 2003;Wright
et al., 2014). A large subset of this stream of research has analyzed labor mobility in the context
of employee startups, interchangeably referred as spin-outs or spin-o¤s (Agarwal et al., 200
4
,
2015
;
Audretsch and Keibach, 2007
;
Campbell et al., 2012
;
Franco and Filson, 2006). Existing
theory and empirical analysis have, however, primarily looked at founders of spin-o¤s driven by
the identication of a market opportunity. Two gaps are, therefore, identied: rst, the relative
inattention paid to the founders role as a catalyst who mobilizes an entire team, and, so, to
initial human resources beyond the founder (Agarwal et al., 2015
;
Williamson and Robinson,
2008)
;
second, the heterogeneous context where employee startups may be created (e.g., Bruneel
et al., 2013; Buenstorf, 2009; Clarysse et al., 2011).
We address these gaps by building and testing a theory on the role of coworker mobility in the
survival of pushed (or necessity-driven) and pulled (or opportunity-driven) employee startups.
Our study builds on the extensive research on spin-o¤s and on two emerging, yet separate,
streams of work: a rst one investigating hiring choices in startup rms (Coad et al., 201
4;
Dahl
and Klepper, 2015; Ouimet and Zarutskie, 2014), and a second one acknowledging the di¤erent
contexts surrounding spin-o¤ activity (e.g., Bruneel et al., 2013; Buenstorf, 2009; Rocha et al.,
2015a, 2015b).
To test our hypotheses, we use a rich matched employer-employee dataset virtually covering
all the private rms employing at least one wage earner in Portugal. Empirically, we adopt a
novel methodology and estimate a three-stage model that addresses two important empirical
issues often neglected in prior studies, which bias the estimated e¤ects of (co)worker mobility
in the context of newly founded rms: self-selection into entrepreneurship and endogeneity in
1The story of  on   on and its people is available at www.kilmerhouse.com (see
http://ilmerhouse	
///-years-ago-
e-woodohnson-arrives-in-new-brunswic/k
1
foundershiring choices. Our data o¤er a great potential to study labor mobility issues in the
context of entrepreneurship, allowing the identication of both entrepreneurs and employees, as
well as their prior interactions in work-related networks (Campbell, 200). Moreover, Portugal
constitutes an interesting setting to be studied, given the growing number of pushed and pulled-
driven startups established over the 10s and 2000s, and the rigidity of the labor market 
which may have important implications in entrepreneursearly recruitment decisions and future
performance of new ventures.
Our study contributes to prior research on labor mobility and entrepreneurship by investigat-
ing a particular kind of labor mobility  coworkers co-moving with spin-o¤ founders  in a new,
and comparative, context  pushed and pulled spin-o¤s. This work has important implications
for broader theories on the role of labor mobility in organizational outcomes of arrival rms,
and also for developing theories on labor markets for entrepreneurship. It also constitutes an
important step towards unpacking the mechanisms through which mobile human capital a¤ects
the performance of receiving rms.
In what follows, we develop the theoretical framework and the hypotheses. We then present
the data and methodology, followed by a brief description of the spin-o¤ activity and coworker
mobility in our setting. Finally, we present our ndings, and discuss their implications for theory,
practice, and policy.
eoret ca ra ewor a d y ot eses
Spin-o¤ activity is, itself, a labor mobility process, and has been the focus of most literature
connecting entrepreneurship and labor mobility issues (Audretsch and eibach, 200 Campbell
et al., 2012). Despite the importance of employment mobility for management theory and prac-
tice, we still lack a thorough understanding of this phenomenon in di¤erent contexts triggering
new venture creation.
We integrate the insights from existing research on spin-o¤s  which has generally addressed
mobility at the level of the founder, and in contexts of voluntary (e.g., opportunity-driven)
mobility  with two related, but still developing, streams of analysis: hiring choices in startups
and the context triggering new venture creation. The integration of these research strands will
form the basis for the development of our hypotheses.
2
owor er ob ty a d ost e try s r a o s o s
The widespread research on inter-rm labor mobility has demonstrated that mobile employees
represent potential sources of knowledge, competencies, information, and routines that benet
the performance of receiving rms (e.g., Bidwell and eller, 201ﬀ Parrotta and Pozzoli, 2012ﬀ
Song et al., 200ﬁ). Team, rm, industry, and regional-specic knowledge can, therefore, move
across rm boundaries (Agarwal et al., 200ﬀ Franco and Filson, 2006) and endow the receiving
rms with valuable and non-imitable resources. Learning by hiring theories, indeed, postulate
that rms can learn from workersﬂexperiences with prior employers (Parrotta and Pozzoli, 2012ﬀ
Song et al., 200ﬁ), which make human capital a strategic resource, and recruitment a strategy
in itself (Phillips and Gully, 201ﬃﬀ Wright et al., 201).
In the context of startup rms, early recruitment choices are among the most critical decisions
for organizational success and survival (Campbell, 200ﬃ). The quality of the labor force assem-
bled at early stages may provide the basis for rm capabilities and comparative advantages (Dahl
and lepper, 201ﬃﬀ Dahl and Sorenson, 201), and hiring mobile workers can provide young and
less productive rms with a valuable opportunity to learn from more experienced rms. Despite
the considerable attention paid by both the strategy and human resources management elds
to the concept of human capital (Wright et al., 201), thorough research on strategic human
capital and hiring practices of new rms in particular is still rare (Coad et al. (201), Dahl and
lepper (201ﬃ), and Ouimet and arutskie (201) being among the rst studies). However, the
early hiring decisions of startups will likely inuence their performance, and will be di¢ cult to
emulate or change when a rm is older (Geroski et al., 2010ﬀ Rocha et al., 2016).
Most new ventures are founded by prior employees, and work histories may provide key
resources  such as human and social capital  for prospective entrepreneurs (Burton et al., 2002ﬀ
S renson and Fassiotto, 2011). While a wide literature has studied the formation of spin-o¤s as
a particular form of labor mobility, through which knowledge may be transferred from a parent
company to a new rm (Agarwal et al., 200ﬀ Campbell et al., 2012ﬀ Dahl and Sorenson, 201ﬀ
Franco and Filson, 2006ﬀ lepper and Thompson, 2010), very few studies have looked at labor
mobility phenomena beyond the startup founder (see Boschma et al., 200!ﬀ Agarwal et al., 201ﬃ).
Still, founders rarely venture out on their own, often turning to their colleagues to assemble a
team (Agarwal et al., 201ﬃﬀ Groysberg et al., 200"). Given their lack of experience and resources,
the ma#ority of newly established ventures do not (yet) have formal human resources strategies
and, instead, rely on informal recruitment channels to attract employees to their organizations
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Hiring former coworkers is, therefore, one of their natural alternatives
(Nziali and Fayolle, 201).
Brymer et al. (201) propose pipelines as a sta¢ ng practice that rms (including newly
ﬁ
founded ventures) use to cope with many challenges that labor markets present, such as infor-
mation asymmetries, applicant scarcity, and costly mis-hires. By using a$ nity groups, social
ties, and%or existing organizations (that already did the necessary screening among employees)
as pipelines through which they ac'uire most of their human resources, rms may better deal
with the uncertainty in the labor market, reduce the searching and integration costs that are
inherent in human capital ac'uisition, and circumvent situations of adverse selection (Bidwell
and (eller, 201)* Dahl and Sorenson, 201)). This may be especially relevant in new and small
rms, where hiring costs can still be substantial (Blatter et al., 2012).
It can, hence, be argued that hiring former coworkers may result in greater stability and
predictability of a rm+s stock of skills and capabilities, better coordination and control, enhanced
socialization, and lower transaction costs (Lepak and Snell, 1,,,). By having shared some
experiences in the parent rm, the presence of coworkers in the initial workforce can also foster
trust, enhance communication, e$ ciency, and cooperation among team members (Groysberg et
al., 200-* Leana and Van Buren, 1
,,,
).
Former coworkers are, therefore, believed to be a source of human and relational capital
(Nziali and Fayolle, 201)). Besides the knowledge, skills, and expertise gained through educa-
tion and training, former coworkers bring also team-specic capital built through close working
relationships at the parent rm. Some components of human capital are likely to be lost once
individuals change employers, namely colleague- and team-specic components (Campbell et al.,
201)). The co-mobility of founders and former coworkers mitigates this risk, and the relational
capital embodied in the team (e.g., shared values, ties, and language) makes, furthermore, the
human resources of the new venture uni'ue and di$ cult to imitate (Lepak and Snell, 1,,,), and
increases the potential for knowledge transfer (Mawdsley and Somaya, 201.).
For those reasons, employee startups are expected to benet from coworker mobility, and
to over-perform those spin-o¤s that do not rely on this pool of human resources. Nonetheless,
this recruitment strategy is not necessarily an un'ualied positive. Overreliance on former
coworkers when setting up the initial team may create some lock-in problems, if the in0ows
of skills resemble those already present in the plant (e.g., in the founder), and may lock-out
potentially more 'ualied candidates who are strangersto the founder (Boschma et al., 200,*
Brymer et al., 201)). Including former coworkers in new organizational teams may, besides, be
driven by founders+homophily preferences and strong ties (Ruef et al., 2001), which has potential
costs, such as organizational inertia, lack of innovation and creativity, with implications for rm
+
s
ability to adapt to environmental changes and shocks (Brymer et al., 201)* Leana and Van Buren,
1,,,* Lepak and Snell, 1,,,). Dense and long-standing ties among some organizational members
may also raise the risk of undesired collusions among employees (Baron and (reps, 1,,,). Last
)
but not least, founders attracting former coworkers likely face a trade-o¤ between the benets
of accessing to a pipeline of workers with valuable knowledge and experience, and the costs of
labor poaching, which may include higher wage bills to attract workers from incumbent rms,
and competitive reactions from poached rms (Combes and Duranton, 20062 Pe6er and :eil,
201<).
We expect, even so, that the benets more than compensate the possible costs of coworker
mobility, especially in the context of newly founded startups fraught by uncertainty, information
asymmetries, and hiring costs that can be detrimental to their survival (Blatter et al., 2012).
The benets of using pipeline recruitment strategies are also expected to be amplied in smaller
hiring rms, with narrowly focused human capital sources (Brymer et al., 201=). Therefore, we
hypothesize that:
>ypothesis ? @>?A: The presence of former coworkers in the initial workforce reduces
spin-o¤ exit risk.
We acknowledge, however, that coworker mobility may have some downsides, and so we
conduct post-hoc analyses to investigate this.
ar y r dec s o s co te t: s ed a d ed dr e star
t s
When hiring mobile individuals, destination rms are ultimately interested in specic attributes
of the potential employee6s human and relational capital that they anticipate will provide value.
The impact of labor mobility on organizational outcomes is, then, likely to vary on the basis of
contextual factors  such as attributes of the employee, source, and destination rms  that may
moderate the transfer and utilization of human and relational capital held by mobile individuals
(Mawdsley and Somaya, 201B).
The context where spin-o¤s emerge is a topic of increasing discussion in the literature, since
not all spin-o¤s arise from the identication of a business opportunity. Many employees of
incumbent rms also decide to set up their own rm to escape from deteriorating Cob conditions,
or as a response to a recent Cob loss, being therefore referred to as pushed or necessity-driven
spin-o¤s (e.g., Andersson and :lepper, 201
<
2 Bruneel et al., 201
<
2 Buenstorf, 200D2 Eriksson and
:uhn, 20062 Muendler et al., 2012). While the dominating argument in this literature proposes
that better parent rms spawn better spin-o¤s  implying that pushed spin-o¤s underperform
their pulled counterparts (Buenstorf, 200D2 Dahl and Sorenson, 201=2 Eriksson and :uhn, 2006)
B
 recent evidence shows that initial team composition may help reducing the survival gap often
observed between those two groups of startups (Rocha et al., 201Eb).
This implies that not all rms benet from the same resources in the same way. When decid-
ing to recruit the very rst employees, founders may follow di¤erent, but not mutually exclusive
strategies. They may choose employees based on social psychological motives, homophily prefer-
ences, and interpersonal t (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006F Eisendhardt and Schoonhoven, 1GG0F Ruef
et al., 200I), andLor they may focus on complementarities and the need for certain skills neces-
sary to run a successful business (Wright et al., 201M). The context driving new venture creation
can play a role in such strategies and, conseNuently, some rms  namely the less well-endowed
 may particularly benet from the privileged access to existing employee pools in clusters or
pipelines (Brymer et al, 201MF PeOer and Peil, 201I), such as prior coworkers.
Newly hired employees are not yet fully productive for several weeks, and this causes severe
productivity losses (Blatter et al. 2012) that may have long lasting conseNuences in rm sur-
vival. This fact is especially important in countries with rigid labor market legislation, where
QfailedRhiring decisions are costly and diS cult to adTust afterwards (Geroski et al., 2010F Rocha
et al., 2016). Therefore, new business founders have large incentives to use informal recruit-
ment processes and rely on existing networks (Williamson and Robinson, 200U), hence reducing
searching costs at entry. These channels may be especially valuable for pushed-driven entrepre-
neurs, who most likely react to displacement by entering entrepreneurship (Berglann et al., 2011F
RVed and SkogstrVm, 201MF von Grei¤, 200G) under a larger (time and nancial) pressure than
more opportunity-based entrepreneurs, who possibly had more time to think and decide about
the creation of their own business. Furthermore, the longer the period spent in unemployment,
the larger the labor market penalties afterwards (e.g., wage penalties and decreased chance of
nding a new Tob), and the higher the risk of human capital depreciation (Baptista et al., 201MF
Wuttunen et al., 2011), which increases the urgency in the decision making.
This pressure is likely to inXuence hiring decisions in pushed and pulled spin-o¤s. The more
time is spent searching for a suitable employee, the higher the costs incurred, but the better the
expected match.
W
owever, given the higher degree of urgency in pushed-driven startups, they
often cannot a¤ord to Qhold outR for long in the hope of nding the most suitable employees.
Pushed spin-o¤s may, therefore, be expected to compromise the Nuality of their early hires for
speed of hiring. Relying on former coworkers whose competences and skills are already known
by founders may help compensating this liability.
Nevertheless, startups typically have a hard time to attract top employees (Coad et al., 201M
F
Dahl and Plepper, 201E), and the fewer assets a rm owns in early stages, the more diS cult
is to attract Nualied labor. Even though steeper earning proles may be achieved later on by
6
those employees progressing through a small growing rm, the risk of involuntary displacement
due to startup failure is higher, and initial wages tend to be lower than in established, more
mature, and less cash-constrained rms (Campbell, 200Y, 201[).
This may create further constraints to early-stage entrepreneurs, who might have to pay
a higher wage bill in order to compensate new hires for the risk of being employed in a rm
with a higher hazard. These costs are, however, expected to be relatively lower in spin-o¤s
originating from closed or declining parent rms: not only are they less exposed to the risk of
competitive reactions from poached parent rms, as it may also be easier for them to attract
former (displaced) coworkers at a relatively lower cost, in case they do not have any better
immediate alternative in the labor market that prevents the depreciation of their competencies.
\iring former coworkers may, accordingly, fulll a much greater advantage for pushed spin-
o¤s compared to their pulled-driven counterparts. We therefore hypothesize that:
]y^ot_es`s a b]ac: The negative e¤ect of coworker mobility on spin-o¤ exit risk is larger
in pushed-driven spin-o¤s than in pulled-driven spin-o¤s.
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical model to be tested in the next sections. From the previous
discussion, there are two main (non-mutually exclusive) mechanisms through which coworker
mobility may improve (pushed and pulled) spin-o¤ survival. First, former coworkers may transfer
valuable knowledge from the parent rm to the new spin-o¤, and this may endow the receiving
rms with a competitive advantage relative to spin-o¤s with no former coworkers in their initial
workforce. Second, hiring former coworkers may also help reducing information asymmetries
and searching costs in newly founded spin-o¤s, which, in turn, is likely to decrease their exit
risk. We conduct post-hoc analyses to investigate to what extent these two mechanisms are
empirically relevant in the context of pushed and pulled-driven startups.
fff Figure 1 here fff
ro t eory to e r ca a a ys s: o r e r ca co tr b t o
Since Lucasgs (1lmn) seminal work, scholars became aware that not all individuals are likely
to leave employment to become entrepreneurs, given their di¤erent levels of entrepreneurial or
managerial talent. Several studies have theorized and demonstrated that those who become
entrepreneurs are a selection of the brightest workers (e.g., Cambell et al, 2012o Franco and
Filson, 2006o rlepper and Thompson, 2010), though in some cases they may also correspond
to the worst employees in a rm (von Grei¤, 200
l
), or even to a mix of both stars and mists
m
(Åstebro et al., 2011). In our context, these results suggest that spin-o¤ founders are a non-
random sample of employees from parent rms, but a self-selected group of individuals who may
base their decision on their ability or innate talent, which is unobservable to us.
Additionally, both seminal (Lucas, 1stu) and more recent studies (Agarwal et al., 201vw
Baptista et al., 201xw Dahl and ylepper, 201v) document that the most able entrepreneurs are
likely to attract more and better (e.g., more skilled) employees. Consezuently, early hires tend
to be allocated to rms according to founders{ability, and the best founders may strategically
assemble teams that represent strong complementarities. Again, this implies that, in our context,
the decision of hiring former coworkers may be strongly correlated with unobservable traits of
spin-o¤ founders, which makes coworker mobility potentially endogenous to spin-o¤ survival.
Our empirical approach addresses these two issues. We acknowledge those earlier results, and
adopt a recent methodology (see Roodman, 2011) that allows the |oint estimation of the follow-
ing three stages: i) the employee decision of becoming an entrepreneurw ii) the entrepreneurs{
subse
z
uent decision of hiring former coworkersw and nally, iii) the e¤ect of coworker mobility
on spin-o¤ survival  which is the core relationship we want to investigate. Both self-selection in
entrepreneurship (rst stage) and the possible endogenous nature of coworker mobility (second
stage) need to be carefully addressed in order to derive any causal e¤ects from coworker mobility
on spin-o¤ survival in the third stage.
ata a d et ods
ata a d sa e
Our data come from Quadros de Pessoal (hereafter, QP), a large longitudinal linked employer-
employee register dataset maintained by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment. QP covers
all rms operating in the Portuguese private sector and employing at least one wage earner.
Available information at the rm-level covers employment, sales, industry, ownership, location,
among other details. At the individual-level, QP reports information about each worker{s age,
education, gender,
z
ualications, wages, occupation, tenure, number of hours worked, and type
of contract. All rms, establishments and workers are identied with a uni
z
ue identication
number, so they can be matched and followed over time. We have access to the original QP les
for the period 1su6-200s.2
2We do not have information at the worker-level in }~~ and 2001. For this reason, we focus our analysis
on spin-o¤s founded in
}~~
 or later, excluding those founded in 2001  whose founder cannot be accurately
identied.
u
Entries of new rms are identied by the rst year a rm is recorded in QP les. Firm exit
is identied by the moment when a rm stops answering the survey. Following previous studies
that also use QP dataset (e.g., Geroski et al., 2010 Mata and Portugal, 2002), we have reuired
an absence of the rm from the les larger or eual to two years in order to identify its denite
exit.
Our analysis focuses on startups founded (in t) by individuals (or teams of founders) who were
in paid employment before (in t 1 or t 2) in incumbent rms. We follow the same denition of
spin-o¤s (or spin-outs) adopted in prior studies also using matched employer-employee data (e.g.,
Andersson and lepper, 201 Dahl and Sorenson, 201 Eriksson and uhn, 2006 Muendler et
al., 2012). We consider both startups founded in the same and in a di¤erent -digit industry as
the parent rm, as Eriksson and uhn (2006) and Muendler et al. (2012).
We identify a total of 2, new startups whose founders were in paid employment before
rm creation. We refer to the previous employer as the parent rmŁthroughout the analysis.
Out of these, 1,22 startups were founded by individuals who left a parent rm that was
declining or that denitely closed down in the same year they were employed there for the last
time. We classify this group of startups as pushed spin-o¤s. The remaining 1,1 startups
were founded by individuals who were previously employed in incumbent rms that continued
operating after their exit. A likely reason for their exit might have been the identication of an
entrepreneurial opportunity, so we classify them as pulled spin-o¤s.
Figure 2 depicts the positive evolution in the number of pushed and pulled-driven spin-o¤s
in the Portuguese private sector. All these rms employ at least one wage employee since their
entry. The numbers show that pushed-driven startups deserve further attention, given that
the number of new spin-o¤s triggered by necessity was higher than the startup activity driven
by opportunity identication in most of the years. We also observe relatively more prominent
startup activity in periods of economic downturn (e.g., 1, early 2000s, and the years preceding
the global nancial crisis of the late 2000s), which may indicate that entrepreneurship is chosen
by disproportionately more individuals in times of crisis, not only for necessity reasons, but
also due to the identication of new market opportunities. Portugal, thus, o¤ers an interesting
context to be studied, considering the growing number of new startups being created over time
(and the relatively large number of pushed-driven rms), as well as the specicities of its labor
Most of these pushed startups (10, in total) have origin in rms that denitely closed down before spin-o¤
creation. The remaining founders come from incumbent rms that su¤ered massive downsizing (higher than 
with a minimum of ve displacements) and that closed down within one or two years. The possibility that some
of these spin-o¤s are a restructuration of closed parent rms is ruled out by excluding startups whose initial
workers have a tenure larger than 2 months in the year of entry. Our sample is also unlikely to include new
rms resulting from mergers or ns, as less than   of rm closures in Portugal are caused by ¡£¤
(Geroski et al., 2010). Both aspects reinforce that the displacements identied in our data are exogenous.

market, known as one of the most rigid and regulated labor markets in OECD (OECD, 2012).
Given the di¥ culty in changing initial conditions over rms¦lifecycle, and the non-negligible role
of new spin-o¤s (including those driven by necessity) in §ob creation (Rocha et al., 201¨a), we
provide a novel and relevant setting to investigate the benets of coworker mobility for pushed
and pulled spin-o¤s survival.
©©© Figure 2 here ©©©
In order to address self-selection into entrepreneurship and the potential endogeneity in the
recruitment of former coworkers, we need to take into consideration all the employees hired
at the parent rm right before spin-o¤ creation. Our nal pool of employees includes 1,1ª6,0«¬
individuals, out of which 2­®were employed in declining incumbent rms that closed down in the
same year or within two years at most (see Figure ¯). About 6® of them became entrepreneurs
(business owners) after leaving the rm, some of them in teams, thus sharing the ownership of
the new business.° As expected, the proportion of workers in other (surviving and non-declining)
incumbent rms who started their own venture is much lower (1.ª
®
), as their opportunity costs
of leaving wage employment are naturally higher.
We also identify a considerable number of employees moving out of the parent rm and being
hired by spin-o¤s in the year of their creation, whom we refer to as ±coworkers². Most spin-o¤s
hire one or two coworkers. The small size of most parent rms gives support to the claim that
spin-o¤ founders and mobile coworkers actually know each other and have interacted ³uite often
in the previous work environment (the median number of employees is six (fourteen) in pushed
(pulled) spin-o¤s¦parent rm by the time of founders¦exit). This is further reinforced by the
fact that most founders and coworkers had the same or close (contiguous) ³ualication levels at
the parent rm, which broadly correspond to hierarchies at the workplace.
This labor mobility phenomenon is, yet, more remarkable among pushed spin-o¤s:
­­®
of
pushed-driven startups hired at least one coworker from the parent rm, while this kind of labor
mobility was only observed in 1¯® of pulled spin-o¤s. The fact that pushed spin-o¤s have a
higher degree of urgency in setting up a team with lower information asymmetries may explain
this di¤erence. Furthermore, pulled spin-o¤s¦founders may have a harder time attracting former
coworkers, who have probably better work conditions and career prospects in the parent rm.
©©© Figure
¯
here ©©©
´This explains why the number of founders is higher than the number of startups.
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r ca et odo o y
The main goal of our empirical analysis is to study how coworker mobility a¤ects spin-o¤ survival
(µypothesis 1), and how di¤erent is the e¤ect for pushed and pulled spin-o¤s (µypothesis 2). As
previously discussed, two empirical issues must be addressed in order to study the causal e¤ects
of coworker mobility on spin-o¤ outcomes: rst, self-selection e¤ects in entrepreneurship entry,
and, second, endogeneity in the founders¶decision of hiring coworkers. We, therefore, frame
our empirical analysis in a three-stage model, and simultaneously estimate the three (binary)
recursive outcomes: 1) entrepreneurial entry· 2) founders¶decision of hiring previous coworkers·
and ¸) spin-o¤ survival. Not all employees in the parent rm decide to become entrepreneurs
and found their own business. As a result, the second and third outcomes are only observed
among those who actually made the decision of leaving the parent rm to spin-out. While this
group of individuals may be a non-random sample of employees, their unobserved attributes 
e.g., ability  may also drive their hiring decisions once they engage in startup activity, and
¹ointly a¤ect their performance later on. Neglecting these aspects is likely to bias the core e¤ect
of interest: the impact of coworker mobility on spin-o¤ survival.
The three stages of our model are illustrated in Figure º. To allow for the ¹oint estimation of
these three stages, we tested our hypothesized e¤ects with robust maximum likelihood estimation
in a simultaneous e»uation model with correlated error terms, as proposed by Roodman (2011).
The system corresponds to a multi-e»uation probit model, also containing a µeckman-type
selection model, where selection into entrepreneurship (rst stage) is modeled along the two
dependent variables observed for the subset of spin-o¤ founders (second and third stages).
¼¼¼ Figure
º
here ¼¼¼
The rst stage e»uation includes three main sets of variables that, according to existing
literature, are likely to explain why individuals leave paid employment and become entrepreneurs
(e.g., ½stebro et al., 2010· Berglann et al., 2011· Burton et al., 2002· Campbell et al., 2012·
µyytinen and Maliranta, 200¾): individual-level characteristics, parent rm characteristics, and
contextual factors. At the individual-level, we consider gender, age, and both general and specic
human capital. Employees
¶
general human capital is measured by their education level, their
»ualications (from a set of eight possible »ualication levels or hierarchies), and by their hourly
wage in the parent rm. We also include the number of di¤erent rms where the individual
was employed to capture the diversity of their labor market experience, which was earlier shown
to in¿uence entrepreneurial choices (e.g., Rocha et al., 201Àc). As measures of specic human
capital, we consider their tenure (in months) in the parent rm, the experience (in years) in the
industry, and the accumulated experience in management and business ownership positions (also
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in years). Regarding parent rm characteristics, we consider rm size (number of employees)
and whether the individual was employed in a declining or closing parent rm (to distinguish
between necessity and opportunity-driven entrepreneurial decisions). We then control for several
contextual factors, namely the industry and region of the parent rm, and the macroeconomic
environment (by including year dummies).
The second stage eÁuation  hiring previous coworkers  includes the same set of variables
mentioned above, now observed only for those who became founders of new rms. Furthermore,
it includes a set of indicator variables to distinguish between spin-o¤s founded i) in the same or
in a di¤erent Â-digit industry as the parent rm, ii) in the same or in a di¤erent location (mu-
nicipality) as the parent rm, iii) by a single founder or a team of two or more founders coming
from the same parent rm (shared ownership). These startup conditions are also expected to
inÃuence the decision of hiring former coworkers. This second e
Á
uation also includes entry year
and industry dummies to control for di¤erences in coworker recruitment choices over time and
across industries.
The nal stage  spin-o¤ survival  will allow us testing the validity of our hypotheses.
Coworker mobility, already modeled in the second stage, is one key explanatory variable of
spin-o¤ survival. The coeÄ cient obtained for this variable will provide the basis for testing our
Æypothesis 1. Spin-o¤ type  pushed versus pulled  will also be included in the set of explanatory
variables, given the growing debate about performance gaps between pushed and pulled spin-o¤s
(Buenstorf, 200ÇÈ Dahl and Sorenson, 201ÉÈ Eriksson and Êuhn, 2006). The second hypothesis
will then be tested by including an interaction term between these two variables (Hire coworkers x
Pushed spin-o¤ ). This nal e
Á
uation will, additionally, control for founderËs general and specic
human capital, as described before, as well as startup conditions (shared ownership, similarity
to parent rmËs industry and location, and initial size), parent rm size (in order to test whether
smaller rms produce better entrepreneurs, as suggested by Æyytinen and Maliranta (200Ì) and
Rocha et al., (201Íc), among others), and average human capital in the initial workforce (age
and education level), as proxies for spin-o¤ average wage costs. In case of spin-o¤s founded by
teams of two or more founders, human capital measures will correspond to the average human
capital in the founding team.
The estimations will be cluster-adÎusted to further account for non-independence of the ob-
servations of employees working in the same parent rm. Finally, though Wilde (2000) shows
that a general (recursive) multi-e
Á
uation probit model is identied as long as each e
Á
uation con-
tains one varying predetermined variable, as in our case, we include some exclusion restrictions
to improve identication. We augment the rst stage (selection) eÁuation and introduce the
entry rate of new rms in the municipality in the previous year, as a proxy of the entrepreneur-
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ial environment in each narrow region. While this variable is believed (and shown) to a¤ect
employeesÏentrepreneurial propensity, it is exogenous to the foundersÏfuture decision of hiring
coworkers from the parent rm. We additionally included two other variables in the second-
stage eÐuation that are found to be signicant predictors of the decision of hiring coworkers,
but not signicant predictors of spin-o¤ survival  the proportion of skilled and unskilled (low
skilled, unskilled, trainees, and apprentices) workers employed at the parent rm, before spin-o¤
creation. The skill composition of the overall workforce at the parent rm proxies the availabil-
ity of human resources that might be of interest of spin-o¤ founders, which is likely to a¤ect
foundersÏprobability of hiring former coworkers, being exogenous to the survival prospects of
new ventures.
s ed a d ed s o act ty a d cowor er o
b ty: A descr t o
Before presenting the results and testing our hypotheses, this section provides a brief description
of our sample and documents some individual-level di¤erences that will be taken into account
in the estimations. Besides examining whether there is any survival bonus in hiring former
coworkers, we also brieÑy describe who spins-o¤ and who hires former coworkers.
s ed a d ed s o s r a w e cowor ers do ot co
o e
Figure Ò illustrates the survivor functions of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s, with and without
coworkers in their initial workforce. These rst statistics suggest that spin-o¤s with coworkers
survive relatively longer. Unconditionally (i.e., without controlling for any (un)observed charac-
teristics of entrepreneurs and rms), pushed spin-o¤s seem actually to survive longer than their
pulled counterparts, which may be mostly driven by the fact that they rely on former coworkers
more often (e.g., Rocha et al., 201Òb). Raw survival rates show that the share of pushed star-
tups surviving during the studied period is 6ÒÓ among those hiring coworkers and ÒÔÓ for those
without any coworker in the initial workforce. The respective shares among pulled spin-o¤s are
Ò
ÕÓ and ÒÒÓ, which indicates that coworker mobility may, indeed, bring larger survival benets
to pushed-driven spin-o¤s, given the relatively more uncertain conditions and larger pressure
under which they are established.
ÖÖÖ Figure Ò here ÖÖÖ
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We must, still, be aware that spin-o¤ founders  even those driven by necessity  may be a
selection of employees with di¤erent characteristics. Table 1 describes the main characteristics
of di¤erent groups of employees at the parent rm. Those becoming entrepreneurs are more
often male, and have more experience as business owners andØor managers. Coworkers moving
to newly founded spin-o¤s correspond, on average, to younger workers with lower education levels
and wages. This pattern is in line with recent evidence showing that new rms disproportionately
hire young and less educated workers (Coad et al., 201ÙÚ Ouimet and Ûarutskie, 201Ù), who are
relatively more risk tolerant, and more willing to bear a lower labor income and the human
capital risk of working for a startup. The remaining employees at the parent rm are older on
average, have a longer tenure, earn higher wages, and may be, conseÜuently, more diÝ cult to
attract to new startups. There are also signicant di¤erences between employees at declining
rms and employees at other incumbent rms, namely in terms of hourly wages and education
levels. They are, on average, considerably lower among workers in declining rms.
ÞÞÞ Table 1 here ÞÞÞ
As a more ne-grained measure of individualsßability and productivity potential, we addi-
tionally estimated the person xed e¤ect obtained from an AàM wage e
Ü
uation (see Abowd
et al., 1ááá), including both worker and rm xed e¤ects (Figure 6).â We clearly observe that
individuals becoming entrepreneurs correspond to a higher-ability group of employees. This is
consistent with the idea that individuals self-select into entrepreneurship according to their own
ability. A multinomial logit model distinguishing the three alternative groups of employees fur-
ther conrms this claim, by showing that the employeeßs education level and wages at the parent
rm (conventional proxies of individual ability) are positively associated with entrepreneurship
choices afterwards (see Table A.I in the Appendix).
ÞÞÞ Figure 6 here ÞÞÞ
The opposite association is found in coworker mobility, which is indicative that coworkers
absorbed by new spin-o¤s belong to a group of less skilled employees at the parent rm. While
this may be, indeed, the case in pushed-driven startups, pulled-driven founders may be in a
better position to attract some of the best employees in the parent rm (see Figure 6 and the
ãThis xed-e¤ects wage äåæçèéon was estimated using the procedure described in êæéëçìíes and Portugal
(2010), and all the history we have for each individual in the labor market. The dependent variable was dened
as the real hourly earnings (in logs). This wage eåuation controlled for individæçîïs age (and its ðåæçìe), tenure
(and its
ðåæçìä
ñò education,
åæçîé
ócations, year dummies, and, following Abowd et al. ôõöööñ, both worker and
rm unobserved (permanent) heterogeneity, which are typically interpreted as a measure of their (xed) åæçîéèy.
1Ù
person xed e¤ect of coworkers, compared to other workers in each group of parent rms).
These entrepreneurs are more skilled on average, they may have identied a protable market
opportunity, and they are probably less restricted (e.g., nancially) than their necessity-driven
counterparts. This points out that the intentions of pushed and pulled founders when hiring
coworkers may be di¤erent, and that coworker mobility may not necessarily a¤ect the survival
of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s through the same mechanisms.
o res or er cowor ers
We, therefore, further analyze how di¤erent are spin-o¤ founders according to their decision of
hiring former coworkers. A brief comparison between founders hiring and not hiring coworkers
is available in Table A.II (Appendix). To better understand the di¤erent prole of these two
groups of founders, we estimated the second stage of the model  the decision of hiring coworkers
 ÷ointly with the rst-stage decision of entering entrepreneurship (self-selection eùuation), using
the aforementioned method of Roodman (2011). The results (in Table A.III in the Appendix)
show that the decision of hiring coworkers is not random, but negatively correlated with the
unobservable traits that may drive individuals into entrepreneurship, such as ability or risk
taking preferences (rho ú -0.û22ü). This indicates that founders employing former colleagues
are a negative selection of all the entrepreneurs in our sample  who, themselves, are a positive
selection of all the employees in the parent rm (as illustrated in Figure 6). The more experienced
and educated they are, the lower their propensity to absorb labor from the parent rm. This
result hints that founders recruiting from their network may decide to do so to compensate
any relative disadvantage in skills, knowledge, or experience. This also reinforces that hiring
coworkers is endogenous and driven by foundersýunobservable characteristics that are likely to
a¤ect spin-o¤ performance.
es ts
owor er ob ty a d s o s r a
Table 2 reports the results obtained for spin-o¤ exit risk and provide the basis for testing our
theoretical hypotheses. The rst two columns provide the baseline results obtained with the
simple estimation of a probit model for the probability of rm exit, neglecting the issues of self-
selection and endogeneity in coworker mobility previously discussed. We address these concerns
in the last two columns, by simultaneously estimating the three-stage model described earlier.
1þ
The results reported correspond to the last stage of the recursive model: spin-o¤ exit risk. The
results for the rst and second stages are ßualitatively similar to those presented in Table A.III.
From the rst column, we conclude that spin-o¤s hiring former coworkers survive longer,
which conrms our Hypothesis 1. However, the survival bonus resulting from coworker mobility
is notably underestimated when we ignore self-selection in the sample of spin-o¤ founders and
the endogenous nature of their hiring choices, once we compare the estimates obtained in column
3. By computing the average marginal e¤ect of hiring coworkers (from column 3), we conclude
that this labor inow reduces the exit risk of newly founded spin-o¤s by 10.9 percentage points,
on average. This corresponds to a reduction of almost one fourth (23.7%) in the risk of exit for
the average rm, which amounts to 45.9% according to the estimated model. Neglecting those
two empirical issues produces a biased average marginal e¤ect of -7.7 percentage points (column
1).
*** Table 2 here ***
Regarding the remaining variables, the results show that no signicant survival di¤erences
exist between pushed and pulled spin-o¤s once we address the two aforementioned sources of
bias (column 3). Being located in the same 3-digit industry as the parent rm slightly improves
spin-o¤ survival chances, and staying in the same region is found to signicantly decrease the
exit risk. Older founders, with longer experience and higher education levels, run spin-o¤s
with better survival chances, which is line with an extensive literature showing that founder
human capital is a vital determinant of new venture performance (e.g., Eisenhardt et al., 1990;
Rocha et al., 201
5
c, 2016). However, there might be a trade-o¤ in starting a rm with a skilled
and experienced set of workers: though human capital may endow startups with a competitive
advantage, it also implies higher labor costs in early stages, in order to attract, retain, and
compensate better works for the risk of working in startups. Our results indicate that the latter
e¤ect prevails in our sample of spin-o¤s.6
Those who share the business ownership with other founder(s) are more likely to survive, as
they possibly also share risks and nancial assets. New ventures established in larger urban areas
may face higher competition, which increases their exit risk. Startup size is inversely (though
weakly) related to exit risk, while parent rm size seems to play an important role, as spin-o¤s
originating from smaller parent rms survive longer. Though this is apparently conicting with
the idea that better parent rms (which are typically assumed to correspond to larger incumbent
rms) produce more successful spin-o¤s, this result is in line with the literature documenting
6Similar conclusions are obtained if we use the average wage of the initial workforce instead of average age and
education of workers.  wever, given some missing values in wages in startup rms in the rst year of activity,
we would lose a considerable number of observations.
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that smaller rms provide a better context for employees to learn from other entrepreneurs
and to succeed in their own entrepreneurial rms later on (e.g., yytinen and Maliranta, 2008
Parker, 200).
In order to test the validity of the second hypothesis, we extended the exit equation by
including an interaction term between the type of spin-o¤ and the presence of coworkers in the
initial workforce (columns 2 and ). The results support that the negative e¤ect of coworker
mobility on spin-o¤ exit risk is larger in pushed-driven spin-o¤s, in line with ypothesis 2.
This conrms that relying on former coworkers lls a larger gap in initial labor necessities
among those who set up their business for necessity reasons, and possibly under larger time and
nancial pressures. We next conduct some post-hoc analyses in order to better understand the
(di¤erent) value that former coworkers can add to pushed and pulled-driven startups.
ost oc a a yses
Two main mechanisms were theoretically advanced along the development of our hypotheses:
former coworkers may transfer knowledge that increases the survival prospects of the new rm,
and they may also reduce labor searching costs and consequently reduce spin-o¤ exit risk. We
now investigate how empirically relevant they are in our data. First, we extend the last stage of
the multi-equation system in order to test how pushed and pulled spin-o¤sexit risk is a¤ected
by coworkersgeneral and specic knowledge, and by labor adjustment costs at the rm-level.
Second, we analyze how coworker mobility impacts on other spin-o¤ outcomes in later stages.
Table  summarizes the results obtained for spin-o¤ exit, when including measures of cowork-
ersgeneral and specic knowledge, and labor adjustment costs. To account for industry- and
region-specic knowledge embodied in these mobile employees, we consider the relative impor-
tance of coworkers with former experience in the same region or industry where the spin-o¤ is
founded (i.e., their share in the initial workforce). As a proxy of coworkersgeneral knowledge
and ability, we include the hourly wage they earned in the parent rm before moving to the
startup. Finally, in order to measure the costs incurred with recruitment and adjustments in
the workforce in early stages, we add the turnover in the workforce at the end of the rst year
of activity (the sum of hiring and separation rates at the rm-level).
	Our results are robust to several alternative specications and sub-samples. Using the share of coworkers in
the initial workforce, or the number of coworkers, instead of the binary decision of hiring (versus not hiring) any
coworkers produces the same 
ualitative results. The main results are also consistent when we look at particular
sub-samples of spin-o¤s (e.g., spin-o¤s founded by a single founder versus teams of two or more founder, spin-
o¤s established in manufacturing versus services), where knowledge transfer mechanisms could have a di¤erent
relative importance. These results will be available upon re
uest.
As an alternative measure of coworkeability we used their average person xed e¤ect. Most results were


tatively similar to those in Table 
1
 Table  here 
The results support that the presence of former coworkers benets the longevity prospects
of both types of spin-o¤s (1), though the e¤ects are stronger for pushed-driven startups, as
previously hypothesized (2). In the case of pushed spin-o¤s, the survival gain resulting from
coworker mobility is higher when they rely relatively more on former colleagues coming from
the same region where the rm is created. The literature on labor mobility and local labor
markets establishes that distance acts as a mobility barrier and increases rm searching costs
(e.g., Boschma et al., 200 Combes and Duranton, 2006 Peﬀer and Keil, 201 Timmermans
and Boschma, 201ﬁ), so hiring coworkers from the same region where founders set up their rm
may decrease the costs of hiring labor. This may be especially relevant in startups founded in
more adverse conditions, which may need to setup an initial workforce relatively faster and at
a lower price than more opportunity-driven startups, in order to survive. Besides making the
recruitment easier and less costly, these coworkers may also bring specic knowledge about the
region (e.g., contacts of customers and suppliers), which may be particularly important for new
entrepreneurs triggered by necessity.
In contrast, pulled spino¤s are found to benet less from coworkers when they come from
the same industry and region. First, the costs of labor poaching and of competitive reactions
(e.g., rivalry and retaliation) by parent rms are expected to be higher in that case. Second,
these results further suggest that pulled spin-o¤s benet more from workers conveying new
knowledge to the rm (see Timmermans and Boschma, 201
ﬁ
).

iring coworkers whose specic
knowledge is probably very similar to the one embodied in the founder may add less or no value
(knowledge-wise) to the new rm, besides hampering the ability to adapt to, and learn from,
new environments (Peﬀer and Keil, 201).
The results furthermore show that coworkers
ﬀ
average ﬂuality is only a signicant determi-
nant of survival in pulled-driven startups. This may indicate that hiring former coworkers may
improve productivity and knowledge transfer to a higher extent in pulled spin-o¤s, which may
be more able to attract better ﬂuality workers (cf. Figure 6). Finally, both types of spin-o¤s
are found to su¤er a higher exit risk when the adﬃustments in the initial workforce (hiring and
separation rates) are larger, though the e¤ects are more detrimental in pushed spin-o¤s. Pushed-
driven startups seem to be particularly vulnerable to searching and ad
ﬃ
ustment costs, so relying
on former coworkers may help them reducing this liability.
These previous results suggest that both mechanisms (knowledge transfer and reduced search-
ing costs) are relevant explanations for the survival bonus found in spin-o¤s hiring former cowork-
ers. We now look at the e¤ect of coworker mobility on other rm-level outcomes in order to
better infer about the relevance of those mechanisms in the two types of spin-o¤s.
1
Table  summarizes the estimated e¤ects of hiring coworkers on spin-o¤s!average employment
growth, hiring and separation rates, labor productivity, and sales growth during their rst three
years of activity. In order to estimate each of these e"uations, we used our previous three-
stage model but replacing the rm-level outcome in the third-stage e"uation by each of the
outcomes reported in Table  . We furthermore extended the system of e"uations to take into
consideration the fact that these outcomes are only observed for spin-o¤s surviving the rst
three years of activity, which may be a selection of the best and more e¢ cient rms (Jovanovic,
1#$2). For this reason, we added a fourth e"uation to the system to model the probability of
surviving at least for three years.
&&& Table
 
here &&&
We nd that pulled spin-o¤s hiring coworkers grow, on average, 2.1' more in employment
size and 2.$
'
more in sales, and have about (
'
higher productivity levels, during their rst years
of activity, compared to spin-o¤s without coworkers. These results are consistent with the idea
that coworkers may convey some valuable knowledge and experience that boosts the performance
of the receiving rms. )iring coworkers at entry also reduces their future ad+ustments in the
labor force (both hiring and separation rates). This indicates that former coworkers may, indeed,
be good matches for the spin-o¤  owing to the screening that founders could have already made
at the parent rm at a lower cost  reducing the need for large labor ad
+
ustments that often
characterize young rms (
)
altiwanger et al., 201,).
)owever, pushed-driven spin-o¤s are found to score lower than their pulled counterparts
both in early growth and labor productivity, and to perform even poorer when they hire for-
mer coworkers. Moreover, they hire disproportionately less when they include coworkers in their
initial team, and this probably hampers their employment growth. This result highlights the rel-
evance of startup conditions and the long-term conse"uences arising from initial choices (Geroski
et al., 2010- Rocha et al., 2016). Even though we nd that coworker mobility is particularly
relevant for the survival of pushed-driven startups, there might be a trade-o¤ between the sur-
vival benets of "uickly hiring former coworkers with lower information asymmetries and the
detrimental impacts on future performance, especially when founders are not able to attract the
best coworkers (due to time, nancial, and/or founders!ability constraints), and when they rely
mostly on coworkers whose specic knowledge is similar to that already embodied in founders.
This may not only block pushed spin-o¤s!chances of learning and ac"uiring new knowledge from
other sources, but also hinder future growth and their ability to attract better human resources
over their lifecycle. Our analysis, therefore, shows that a longer survival does not necessarily
imply a good performance.
1#
Considering all our results, we nd support for both mechanisms in the case of pulled spin-
o¤s. .iring coworkers may help them surviving longer, not only by reducing the burden of initial
recruitment and searching costs, but also by transferring valuable knowledge and experience
that can enhance their productivity and growth prospects already in early stages. In the case
of pushed-driven startups, coworker mobility seems to diminish their exit risk largely through
the reduction in searching costs at the moment of entry. The detrimental e¤ect of coworker
mobility in pushed spin-o¤s0performance later on does not give support to the knowledge transfer
mechanism in this particular group of startups.
sc ss o a d co c s o
Our aim with this paper was to provide an expanded understanding of how labor mobility
from incumbent rms impacts the survival of new spin-o¤s founded in di¤erent contexts. The
contributions made by this study shed light on a central topic in the entrepreneurship literature
 the value of initial human resources to new venture performance  and ll ma1or gaps within
the existing theories and empirical evidence linking labor mobility and entrepreneurship. Prior
work on this link has widely acknowledged that most entrepreneurs are spawned by existing
rms (Audretsch and 2eilbach, 2006: Burton et al., 2002: Campbell et al., 2012: Sørenson and
Fassiotto, 2011), but generally neglected two points: i) the fact that not all entrepreneurs are
driven by the identication of an opportunity, but sometimes by necessity and deteriorating
conditions in paid employment
:
ii) the fact that founders may often rely on their prior coworkers
when venturing out and setting up their teams.
This paper, thus, contributes to prior research on labor mobility and entrepreneurship by
looking beyond the founders and the so-called pulled spin-o¤s. We are the rst studying the
value of coworker mobility in two di¤erent, but e<ually relevant, contexts: pushed (or necessity-
driven) and pulled (or opportunity-driven) spin-o¤s. This work also contributes to the developing
theories on labor markets for entrepreneurship and to prior research on entrepreneurs0hiring
choices (Coad et al., 201=: Dahl and 2lepper, 201>), by highlighting the central role played by
the founder in these decisions and the long-lasting conse<uences of human capital initial choices.
We also provide an empirical contribution by proposing an empirical methodology that takes
into account two issues largely overlooked by prior studies: self-selection bias in the sample of
entrepreneurs and the endogenous nature of their hiring choices.
Finally, and more broadly, this study also contributes to the literature on the role of labor
mobility in organizational performance, and addresses some of the gaps raised in recent works
(e.g., Mawdsley and Somaya, 201
>
). It provides evidence of di¤erent mechanisms through which
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(co)worker mobility may a¤ect the performance of the receiving rms, it compares this phenom-
enon in di¤erent contexts (i.e., di¤erent types of receiving rms) that may moderate the main
e¤ects under study, and it also challenges the almost taken for granted assumption that labor
mobility benets the performance of receiving rms.
Theoretical? practical? and policy implications
Our study has crucial implications for existing theories on labor mobility and entrepreneur-
ship. We provide important complements to prior work by developing and testing a model of
how hiring former coworkers may di¤erently contribute to startup performance, according to the
context triggering new venture creation. Our analysis implies that, in order to understand the
micro-foundations of entrepreneurship, researchers should take into further consideration not
only the heterogeneous contexts where entrepreneurship emerges, but also the fundamental role
of the founder in the formation, and later ad@ustments, of the team.
Though we focus on spin-o¤s, our analysis has broader implications for inter-rm labor
mobility research. Our results suggest that existing labor mobility theories should accommodate
multilevel contextual factors  such as di¤erent attributes of the source and destination rms,
as well as attributes of mobile individuals  when studying the impacts of employee mobility
on organizational outcomes, besides considering di¤erent mechanisms through which mobile
employees may a¤ect destination rms. Moreover, the consideration of these di¤erent layers
should be complemented by further e¤orts on theorizing the pros and cons of labor mobility for
receiving rms.
Likewise, this work has important implications for managers, and more specically for entre-
preneurs. Our study highlights the value of developing social networks inside organizations to
potential founders. By developing links with coworkers at the workplace, prospective founders
may screen potential team members in advance and at a lower cost, determine which cowork-
ers have important complementary andAor uniBue, non-imitable, skills, and, hence, increase the
survival chance of their entrepreneurial ventures. Nevertheless, when deciding the composition
of their initial workforce and considering hiring coworkers, entrepreneurs should be aware of the
trade-o¤s involved, and balance the benets of reducing the initial uncertainty and recruitment
costs with the risks of blocking learning from external sources of labor.
For policy makers, our work conrms that startup conditions are of chief importance and
have long-term conseBuences, which emphasizes the relevance of policies targeting newborn rms
and supporting entrepreneurs at very early stages. Our comparison between pushed and pulled-
driven startups shows that important employment opportunities are provided by startup rms,
even by those created out of necessity. By relying more often on prior coworkers, pushed spin-o¤s
play an essential role in avoiding the depreciation of human capital of many recently displaced
21
individuals  including the founders themselves. Our results suggest that there is still scope for
policy intervention in startups with origin in declining parent rms. Though these rms help
lessening the penalties of carrier interruptions in the aftermath of a Cob loss, their founders may
need further support in the initial and follow-up stages, not only to reduce the nancial pressure
under which these rms may be established  which has serious impacts on the Duality of the
workers hired  but also to incentivize Cob creation over their lifecycle, and improve their growth
prospects.
LEFEtatEoGs aGd future researcI
Several promising opportunities exist to further extend research in this area. First, al-
though our denition of pulled spin-o¤s follows prior studies also using linked employer-employee
data (e.g., Andersson and Mlepper, 201NO Dahl and Sorenson, 201PO Eriksson and Muhn, 2006O
Muendler et al., 2012), we cannot distinguish between voluntary and involuntary mobility of
founders (e.g., disagreements between the employee and the previous employer (Mlepper and
Thompson, 2010)), neither can we directly infer any information on the size of the opportunity
possibly pursued by the founder. Future research might usefully extend our analysis and explore
more di¤erent contexts within the broad group of pushed and pulled spin-o¤s, by using more
in-depth (e.g., survey-based) information about the motivations behind new venture creation.
Second, though it was not the aim of this paper to decompose the two mechanisms through
which coworker mobility may a¤ect spin-o¤ survival, not even to Duantify their relative impor-
tance in pushed and pulled spin-o¤s, future analyses could study this in more detail, and also
explore alternative or additional mechanisms that may be relevant in this context. We recognize
that we cannot precisely disentangle the two mechanisms, not only because they are not mu-
tually exclusive, but also because some variables may capture both specic knowledge transfer
and reduced searching costs (e.g., the share of coworkers from the same region).
Finally, we have focused on the decision of hiring former coworkers at entry for three reasons.
First, our data reveal that the mobility of former coworkers largely takes place at the moment
of new venture creation, being less freDuent in later stages of the spin-o¤ lifecycle. Second,
founding conditions  including human capital choices  are known to be diQ cult to change
afterwards, and to have long term impacts on rm outcomes (Geroski et al., 2010O Rocha et
al., 2016), especially in rigid labor markets like the Portuguese, where Cob protection and ring
costs are high (which makes labor adCustments very costly, especially in small and young rms).
Third, looking at coworker mobility in later stages of the spin-o¤ lifecycle would impose further
empirical challenges in the estimation of our multi-stage model. We believe our empirical ap-
proach provides an important contribution to the existing literature, by carefully addressing the
issues of self-selection into entrepreneurship and endogeneity in entrepreneursRhiring choices,
22
which are shown to bias the key results of interest. While we accept the trade-o¤ between our
ability of empirically dealing with those issues, and the limitation in not extending the analysis
to coworker mobility in later stages of the rm, we encourage future research to investigate this
Suestion, also in other labor markets with di¤erent degrees of rigidity, where looking at labor
adUustments over rm lifecycle may be relatively more pertinent.
VoWcXYsZoW
By combining the insights from the widespread research on entrepreneurial spin-o¤s and
from the emerging literature on hiring choices in startups, we investigated the role of coworker
mobility in pushed and pulled spin-o¤ survival. Using a rich matched employer-employee dataset
for Portugal, and a multi-stage model addressing the issues of self-selection in entrepreneurship
and endogeneity in recruitment choices, we covered over a million of employees from about 26,[00
parent rms, and a total of 2\,]^] spin-o¤s founded between 1__2 and 200[.
We nd that spin-o¤s hiring coworkers from the parent rm survive longer. The survival
bonus resulting from coworker mobility is higher in pushed-driven startups. Our analysis sug-
gests that coworker mobility improve pulled spin-o¤s`survival chances, not only by transferring
valuable knowledge, but also by reducing founders`searching costs. In the case of pushed spin-
o¤s, coworker mobility seems to largely help them thriving in the market through the reduction in
recruitment costs at entry. This labor inaow is not found to boost pushed spin-o¤s`productivity,
neither growth prospects, which does not give support to the knowledge transfer mechanism.
biring former coworkers seems to be a choice often driven by necessity, which may limit the
Suality of the initial human resources, and hurt future performance, especially in rigid labor
markets.
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of workers at the parent firm, according to their mobility decisions 
 Pushed spin-offs’ parent firms Pulled spin-offs’ parent firms 
 
Startup 
founders 
Coworkers 
moving to 
the new 
startup 
Other 
workers at 
the PF 
Startup 
founders 
Coworkers 
moving to 
the new 
startup 
Other 
workers at 
the PF 
Male 0.6933 0.5780 0.5751 0.6947 0.6133 0.5803 
Age  34.259 33.942 36.275 34.438 34.356 37.003 
Previous experience as business-owner (%) 0.1131 0.0255 0.0195 0.1431 0.0233 0.0214 
Number of different firms as wage employee 1.9071 1.9832 1.9804 2.1418 1.9812 2.0906 
Years of experience in management positions 0.4257 0.0630 0.1543 0.6131 0.1116 0.2705 
Tenure in the parent firm (months) 64.905 64.064 96.599 66.420 70.189 106.81 
Less than 9 years of education (%) 0.5456 0.7639 0.5795 0.4599 0.7156 0.5462 
9 years of education (%) 0.1845 0.1231 0.1552 0.1606 0.1166 0.0992 
12 years of education (%) 0.1870 0.0899 0.1775 0.2214 0.1255 0.2248 
Higher education (%) 0.0829 0.0232 0.0878 0.1582 0.0423 0.1299 
Years of experience in the industry (2digit) 3.3341 3.6357 3.8678 3.7377 3.4239 5.4040 
Hourly wage in the parent firm (log) 4.2175 3.1690 5.3709 6.2934 4.0008 6.9548 
Number of observations (individuals) 17,642 21,131 244,527 16,125 5,482 881,190 
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Table 2. The effect of hiring coworkers on spin-off exit risk  
 Single-equation estimation Multi-equations estimation 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Hire coworkers -0.2279*** -0.0789** -0.3212***  -0.1217** 
 (0.0211) (0.0329) (0.0465)  (0.0587) 
Pushed spin-off -0.0521** 0.0338 -0.0280  0.0400 
 
(0.0203) (0.0250) (0.0230)  (0.0261) 
Hire coworkers*Pushed spin-off  -0.2338***   -0.2254*** 
  (0.0398)   (0.0411) 
Same 3d-industry of the PF -0.0514*** -0.0552*** -0.0343*  -0.0483** 
 
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200)  (0.0215) 
Same municipality of the PF -0.1081*** -0.1084*** -0.1069***  -0.1081*** 
 
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204)  (0.0204) 
Founders’ experience as BOs -0.0173** -0.0173** -0.0158**  -0.0171** 
 
(0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0073)  (0.0073) 
Founders’ age -0.0067*** -0.0066*** -0.0065***  -0.0065*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
Founders’ schooling years -0.0143*** -0.0143*** -0.0143***  -0.0143*** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027)  (0.0027) 
Shared ownership at entry -0.3401*** -0.3413*** -0.3278***  -0.3368*** 
 
(0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0218)  (0.0218) 
Location in urban centers 0.0819*** 0.0814*** 0.0806***  0.0810*** 
 
(0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182)  (0.0182) 
Startup size -0.0015* -0.0015* -0.0015*  -0.0015* 
 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)  (0.0008) 
Parent firm size 0.0476*** 0.0489*** 0.0523***  0.0518*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0092)  (0.0092) 
Workers’ average schooling years 0.0106*** 0.0103*** 0.0104***  0.0102*** 
 
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035)  (0.0035) 
Workers’ average age 0.0042*** 0.0043*** 0.0042***  0.0043*** 
 
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)  (0.0011) 
Constant 0.7772*** 0.7313*** 0.7717***  0.7335*** 
  (0.0933) (0.0937) (0.0941)  (0.0944) 
Spin-off 2d-industry dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Spin-off entry year dummies Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations 28,353 28,353 1,186,097  1,186,097 
Log Likelihood -13,849.0 -13,849.0 -113,077.5  -113,077.5 
The model in the two last columns was estimated using the user-written program cmp (version 6.8.7) for Stata (see Roodman, 2011). *, 
**, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The values reported are coefficients and the values in parentheses 
are robust standard errors, clustered at the parent-firm level.  
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Table 3. Coworkers knowledge, recruitment costs, and spin-off exit risk 
 
Dependent variable: spin-off exit  All spin-offs Pushed spin-offs Pulled spin-offs 
Hire coworkers -0.1527** -0.2556*** -0.2081* 
 (0.0691) (0.0660) (0.1105) 
Pushed spin-off 0.0634**    
 (0.0295)    
Hire coworkers*Pushed spin-off -0.1348***    
 (0.0467)    
Share of coworkers same 3d-industry  0.1318* 0.0981 0.3124** 
 (0.0797) (0.1010) (0.1577) 
Share of coworkers same municipality  -0.1644** -0.3223*** 0.3657** 
 (0.0792) (0.1006) (0.1532) 
Coworkers' average wage in the parent firm -0.0266** -0.0155 -0.1039*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0119) (0.0265) 
Turnover in initial workforce 0.2143*** 0.2968*** 0.1297*** 
  (0.0212) (0.0307) (0.0297) 
Number of Observations 1,186,097 283,300 902,797 
Log Likelihood -110,290.4 -49,255.4 -60,043.8 
All the models were estimated using the user-written program cmp (version 6.8.7) for Stata (see Roodman, 2011). All the specifications include 
the same control variables listed in Table 3. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Values in parentheses are 
robust standard errors, clustered at the parent firm-level. 
 
 
Table 4. The effect of hiring coworkers on other spin-off outcomes  
(Multi-equations estimation) 
 
                                     Average outcomes during the first three years of startup activity 
 
Employment 
growth 
Hiring  
rates 
Separation  
rates 
Labor 
productivity  
Sales  
growth 
  
Hire coworkers 0.0213** -0.0280*** -0.0387*** 0.0764*** 0.0278* 
 (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0056) (0.0277) (0.0165) 
Pushed spin-off 
-0.0183*** -0.0235*** -0.0073 -0.0440** -0.0283** 
 (0.0052) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0224) (0.0142) 
Hire coworkersכPushed spin-off 
  
-0.0344*** -0.0280*** 0.0073 -0.0845** -0.0711*** 
(0.0078) (0.0072) (0.0068) (0.0331) (0.0211) 
Number of observations 1,186,097 1,186,097 1,186,097 1,186,097 1,186,097 
Log-likelihood -119,220.1 -117,618.9 -117,531.1 -141,172.1 -136,139.1 
All the specifications include the same control variables listed in Table 3. For all outcomes the system of equations was extended in order to include 
an additional equation for the probability of surviving for at least three years, in order to take into account that surviving firms may correspond to 
the most efficient or represent the most talented entrepreneurs.  *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Values in 
parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered at the parent firm-level. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model 
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Figure 3. Structure of the data 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Empirical design: recursive system of equations
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Figure 5. Kaplan-Meier survivor function of pushed and pulled spin-offs, with and without coworkers 
at entry 
 
Figure 6. Person fixed effect of spin-off founders, coworkers, and other workers at the parent firm 
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